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ABSTRACT 
 
Auctions have been developed for economic transactions with asymmetric information 
and they are the simplest means of price determination for multilateral trading without 
‘market makers.’ During the last years, new technologies gave a boost to the 
development and usage of innovative auction formats in several fields. We explore 
some of the new possibilities of applications and explain the differences to traditional 
auction formats. Furthermore, we demonstrate the potentialities of auctions concerning 
information gaining for the auctioneer as well as for the participating bidders. 
 
 
 
                                                 
‡ Forthcoming in Knowledge of New Technologies, edited by M. Kouzelis, Kluwer. 
1. Introduction 
 
Situations of economic interaction are usually characterised by asymmetric information. 
This means that one party knows something relevant that the other parties do not know. 
Asymmetries in information are pervasive in economic situations and usually have a 
strong impact on the outcomes and often lead to inefficient results. Therefore, 
economists have to ask how to deal with this problem. In searching for an answer, we 
have a look at one of the oldest economic institutions: the auction. Auctions have been 
developed for economic transactions with asymmetric information, and they are the 
simplest means of price determination for multilateral trading without ‘market makers,’ 
such as brokers. A well-known type of auction is the so-called English auction. This is 
an ascending bid, open-cry auction that is used, for example, for selling wine and arts 
and cattle. However, a wide variety of different formats exist (see Section 2). Auctions 
can lead to efficient outcomes, even in situations with asymmetric information. 
Moreover, auctions can help the auctioneer as well as the bidders to gain valuable 
information. If an auction is well designed, it induces bidders to reveal ‘private’ 
information, i.e. information about their true preferences, willingness to pay, production 
costs, and so on.    
The first reported auction dates back to 500 B.C., when women were auctioned 
off as wives. Within the Roman Empire auctions were used to liquidate property and 
real estate goods. In England auctions became a popular means for selling artwork in 
the 17th century. This popularity continued through the centuries, and even today it is 
still quite popular to sell art objects and antiques at the fall of an auctioneer’s hammer. 
In the 19th century, Dutch farmers began selling fruits and vegetables and German 
fishermen started selling their catch upon arrival at the port via auctions (Cassidy, 
1967).  In the 20th century, the number of fields involved in auctions continuously 
increased. These included the sale of oil and mineral rights as well as awarding public 
contracts. During the last two decades, auctions have also been used throughout the 
world to facilitate the transfer of assets from public to private hands. For example, 
auctions were used for the sale of industrial enterprises in Eastern Europe and 
telecommunication spectrum all over the world (Krishna, 2002).  
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The Internet gave the popularity of auctions a new boost. Auction websites like 
eBay are frequently used. Internet-based auctions are also used for central bank 
refinancing operations and in an increasing extent for business-to-business (B2B) 
transactions. Furthermore, electronically implemented auction formats are also applied 
in awarding public licenses and concessions. For example, auctions have been used 
worldwide for allocating telecommunication licenses (e.g. FCC in USA, GSM-1800 
MHz in Germany, UMTS in the UK, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Austria, and other 
European countries).  
The use of new technologies has rapidly changed the image of auctions. The old 
market institution moved from traditional fields of application in the centre of 
innovative processes. Low transaction and search costs, decentralised bargaining, and 
global trade are slogans of the auction proponents. Besides these effects that emerge 
when auctions are applied, the auction as an instrument with clear specified rules has a 
lot of very nice inherent features. 
In the following we give a short introduction to the basics of auction theory. We 
point out the impact of new technologies on the growth of the number of feasible 
auction formats. Furthermore, the auction institution’s potentialities with regard to 
gaining information in wide variations are highlighted. The conclusion summarises our 
main findings. 
 
 3
2. Auctions 
 
2.1 Basics 
 
In every auction there is an auctioneer who carries out the auction, and there are several 
bidders submitting bids in order to buy or sell one or more items. As a characterization 
of an auction we use the following definition (McAfee and McMillan, 1987): 
 
An auction is a  
• Market institution with an 
• Explicit set of rules determining 
• Resource allocation and 
• Prices on the basis of 
• Bids from the market participants. 
 
Two more characteristics should be mentioned. The rules of an auction have to be given 
in advance and may not be changed once the auction has begun, and there is no need for 
other input besides the bids. 
As you can easily see from the definition, there are different tasks for 
participants in an auction: the seller’s task is to design or choose an appropriate auction 
mechanism, and the bidders’ task is to determine their optimal bidding strategy. The 
calculation of such a strategy is based on the values the bidder assigns to the object, in 
some cases also on the expected other bidders’ valuations, and the rules of the auction. 
If both market sides perform these tasks well, the auction is ensured of an efficient 
result, i.e. the object goes to the bidder who values it the most. 
 
2.2 Information and Valuation 
 
Uncertainty and asymmetry of information are characteristics of the application of 
auctions. First, it is realistic to assume that the auctioneer does not know each bidder’s 
precise valuation of the item at the time when the auction is carried out. Note, if the 
auctioneer is aware of bidders’ valuations, he needs not run an auction. He can 
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maximise his revenue by offering the item at a high price to the bidder who values it the 
most. Second, a bidder may know his individual valuation; however, he usually does 
not know other bidders’ valuations. If each bidder precisely knows his value of the item, 
this is called the private values case. This situation applies, for example, to auctions of 
art objects and antiques in which bidders assign different values to the objects that they 
intend to buy for their own use and not for resale. Implicit in this situation is that there 
may be differences among bidders’ valuations which reflect their differences in taste. 
On the other side, consider bidders as dealers who intend to resell the objects, or think 
of the sale of oil and mineral rights. In these cases, the item has an objective value. 
However, particularly in the case of oil and mineral rights, the true value is not known 
to the participants at the time of the auction. The actual value of an oil right, for 
example, depends on the amount of oil actually lying beneath the ground and its quality. 
In these cases one speaks of common values (McAfee and McMillan, 1987, Krishna, 
2002).  
An auction’s information structure strongly influences the bidders’ bidding 
behaviour and, therefore, also whether the bidders are successful and the auctioneer 
receives the expected revenue. Moreover, different auction formats, which are presented 
in the following sections, may have an impact on optimal bidding behaviour and the 
outcome of an auction, too.   
 
2.3 Single Object Auctions 
 
The four standard auction types for selling one single item are the English auction, the 
Dutch auction, the first price sealed bid auction, and the second price sealed bid 
auction or Vickrey auction (Vickrey, 1961). Let us characterise these four auctions 
through the rules of the mechanisms and the optimal bidding strategies in the case of 
private values (for example, Klemperer, 1999). 
The most popular type of auction is the English auction. It is an ascending price, 
open-cry auction in which the price rises successively. The bidders either call out the 
bids themselves or the seller increases the price. The winner is the last active bidder, 
and the object is sold to the price equal to the highest bid (i.e. the last announced price). 
In this auction, a bidder’s dominant strategy is to bid as long as the price is below his 
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valuation for the object. This bidding strategy is always the best for him no matter what 
the other bidders do. Once his valuation is reached, he leaves the auction. If every 
bidder chooses this strategy, the object will be sold to the bidder with the highest 
valuation for a price equal to the valuation of the bidder with the second highest 
valuation (or slightly above or below, depending on prescribed bid increments). 
Amongst standard auction types, the English auction is the only auction with the chance 
of reconsidering bidding strategies once the auction mechanism has started. 
Nevertheless, a bidder should establish his strategy in advance. 
The second type of open-cry auctions is the Dutch auction. In contrast to the 
English auction, this is a descending price auction. The seller decreases the price 
starting at a relatively high level. When one of the participants accepts the price, he 
wins the auction and has to pay exactly this price. Hence, only one bid is seen in this 
type of auction. Optimal bidding in a Dutch auction is more complicated than in the 
English auction. The calculation of the optimal bid in a Dutch auction is associated with 
bidder’s uncertainty about other bidders’ valuations and therefore is more challenging 
than in the English auction. It is obvious that only a bid below the individual valuation 
can be optimal for a bidder. Moreover, a decrease in the bid increases the gains from 
winning, while at the same time it decreases the probability of winning. 
A very common auction is the first price sealed bid auction. The sealed bids of 
the participants are collected until a closing date. Then all bids are opened, and the 
bidder with the highest bid wins and has to pay his bid. Again, a bidder has to calculate 
a bid that depends on his valuation and his assumptions about other bidders’ valuations. 
An auction with very nice features that is not frequently used is the second price 
sealed bid auction or Vickrey auction. As in the first price auction, every bidder submits 
a sealed bid and the winner is the bidder with the highest bid. However, he only has to 
pay the second highest bid. A bidder’s strategic considerations are very simple because 
his dominant strategy is to submit a bid equal to his own valuation. Note that in this 
auction type the bid only determines whether the bidder wins the auction or not. The 
price he has to pay if he wins is beyond his control. Suppose, a bidder bids below his 
valuation. If he wins, the level of his bid has no influence on the price. In comparison to 
his dominant strategy bid, however, he will lose whenever at least one other bidder 
submits a bid between his bid and his valuation. Imagine now that a bidder bids above 
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his true valuation. If he does not win the auction or the second highest bid is below his 
true valuation, this does not change the situation at all. However, if he wins and the 
second highest bid is higher than his valuation, he experiences a loss because he has to 
pay a price higher than his valuation. Therefore, it is always best to bid the true 
valuation in the Vickrey auction. 
The English auction and the Vickrey auction both have a solution in the form of 
a so-called dominant strategy equilibrium. The dominant strategy equilibrium concept is 
very strong, as it never pays to deviate from the dominant strategy, no matter what the 
other bidders do. Furthermore, the dominant strategy is independent of risk attitudes. If 
a bidder plays this strategy, he will never regret his bid ex post. In both auction types, 
the bidder with the highest valuation wins the auction and pays a price equal to the 
second highest valuation (on average, in the case of the English auction). In contrast, in 
the first price sealed bid auction and the Dutch auction no dominant strategies exist. 
There is a trade-off between increasing the probability of winning the auction (high bid, 
close to valuation) and increasing a bidder’s rent in case of winning (low bid). 
Assuming that every bidder has a private valuation for the object, that they know the 
number of bidders, their risk attitudes, the distributions of valuations, and that they are 
aware that every other bidder knows all that, then it is possible to calculate the optimal 
bids. The situation a bidder faces in the first price sealed bid auction and the Dutch 
auction is exactly the same. In both auctions they have the same information, and the 
bidder with the highest bid wins and has to pay his bid. Thus, these two auction types 
are said to be strategically equivalent, and the optimal equilibrium bids are therefore the 
same. Calculating the optimal bid in these two auctions is a difficult task for which a lot 
of information is required. Since the calculation is based on the probability distribution 
of other bidders’ valuations, it is possible that a bidder regrets his bid ex post (i.e. an 
expected profit maximising bidder always submits a bid below his valuation). Thus, it 
may happen that the item is sold to someone else at a lower price than a bidder’s 
valuation (McAfee and McMillan, 1987).    
These four standard auction formats have a common characteristic which is 
summarised in the famous revenue equivalence theorem (Riley and Samuelson, 1981; 
Myerson, 1981): if the bidders are risk-neutral, have independent private valuations for 
the object, are (ex-ante) symmetric, and the payment only depends on the bids, then the 
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expected price in all four auctions is the same. More precisely, the bidder who values 
the item the most wins the auction and has to pay (on average) the second highest 
valuation. This means that no matter which auction type is chosen by the seller he can 
expect the same revenue if the aforementioned conditions are satisfied. Note that these 
conditions are very restrictive and fairly unrealistic. However, this simplified case 
serves as a valuable reference point in the analysis of auctions. 
The four standard auctions are traditional mechanisms for selling one single 
object to one of several bidders. Many variations and enhancements of these auction 
types are in use. For example, the seller may set a reserve price in form of a required 
minimum bid. He is not willing to sell the object below this price. It can be shown that 
it is advantageous for the seller to set a reservation price higher than his own valuation 
of the item (Myerson, 1981). Results also change if we drop the assumptions of risk-
neutral bidders and/or of bidder symmetry (Vickrey, 1961; Holt, 1980; Maskin and 
Riley, 2000). If we relax the assumption of private values and consider cases with 
interdependent values and common value components, things also change. Here, for 
example, the problem of the so-called winner’s curse arises. This refers to the 
possibility that the bidder who wins the auction pays more than the true value of the 
object, which was not known to the bidders while they were bidding (Milgrom and 
Weber, 1982).  
 
2.4 Multiple Object Auctions 
 
Multiple object auctions can be used if multiple related items are to be sold. Objects 
may be physically identical or distinct. If a seller intends to auction multiple objects, 
many options are open to him because a variety of designs for multiple object auctions 
exist, which differ in several dimensions. The most popular types are the following: a 
sequence of single object auctions, sealed bid auctions for identical objects (e.g. the 
uniform price auction, the discriminatory price auction, the multi-unit Vickrey auction), 
the fixed price tender, the simultaneous multiple-round ascending auction, and package 
auctions. Each of these auction formats was designed for special purposes and has its 
characteristic strengths and weaknesses, e.g. strategic demand reduction and bid 
shading, regret and exposure problems, and the winner’s curse. In this context, it has to 
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be mentioned that these types of auctions are characterised by different levels of 
complexity and require different bidding strategies (Ausubel and Cramton, 1998; 
Krishna, 2002; Ehrhart, 2001).  
 
3. Information and Learning in Auctions 
 
3.1 Generating Information 
 
Auctions may serve as information generators in multiple ways. Incentives to collect 
information prior to an auction may lead participants to make careful preparations. In 
private value auctions, for example, the bidders may try to learn about resale 
possibilities, about costs of production in the B2B sector, or about the competitors’ 
valuations in first price and Dutch auctions (Persico, 2000). In common value auctions, 
bidders should be interested in information about the true value of the object. This 
information may be costly, so precise evaluation of the object might be too expensive. 
In the course of the auction, the auctioneer is able to gather private information about 
participants’ preferences, provided he chooses an appropriate auction format. This may 
also become accessible to the bidders. Particularly in common value auctions with 
incremental bidding, the exit bids deliver valuable information. If the auction format 
supports an efficient allocation, the result of the auction informs participants about the 
one with the highest valuation. Thus, gaining information in advance, during the course 
of auction, and after the auction is possible. 
 
3.2 Information and Learning in Single Object Auctions 
 
We first consider the English auction. If the bidders follow their dominant strategy, i.e. 
they bid until the price exceeds their valuation, the auctioneer ascertains the bidders’ 
valuations via their drop-out prices. At the end of the auction, he has learned a lot about 
bidders’ valuations; however, he does not know the valuation of the winner who values 
the object the most. The price formation is driven by the competition between the 
bidders. Thus, the evolution of the price gives the seller a hint of the value of the object 
on the market, particularly if a large number of bidders competes in the auction. 
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In the course of a Dutch auction, the auctioneer only learns the aggregate 
information of the winning bid, provided that the winning bidder has calculated his bid 
using all available information. As a result, the auctioneer learns less in a Dutch auction 
than in an English auction. In fact the Dutch auction is the type of auction with the least 
information gain for the auctioneer. 
In the first price sealed bid auction the seller opens all submitted sealed bids. 
Again, these bids depend on the bidders’ individual valuations and their information and 
assumptions about the other bidders’ valuations. In contrast to the strategic equivalent 
Dutch auction, the auctioneer receives information from all bids and not just from the 
highest bid. 
The optimal information gain for the auctioneer is provided in the Vickrey 
auction. If all bidders play their dominant strategy, then the seller will know all 
valuations. In contrast to the first price auction, it is very easy for him to generate this 
information from the bids: he can simply read it off. 
So far we only considered the private values case in which we assume that every 
bidder has a private valuation for the object. Now, we consider the case of a pure 
common-value object in which the value of the item is the same for all bidders, but it is 
not known in advance. At the time of the auction, bidders may access different 
information about the value of the item (Klemperer, 1999). Hence, in open-oral 
auctions, a bidder’s estimation of the item’s true value is influenced by observing his 
competitors’ bids, which give a hint about the other bidders’ information. Therefore, in 
the case of common value objects, the English auction for example, serves as an 
information generator about the true value of the object. Note that contrary to the 
private value case, the English and second price auctions are no longer equivalent in the 
case of common values. In the English auction the seller can expect a higher revenue 
than in the second price auction. In the English auction, the information gained in the 
course of the auction reduces bidders’ uncertainty and thus the danger of the winner’s 
curse and therefore leads to more aggressive bidding (Milgrom and Weber 1982). 
Moreover, in the common value case it is on average more advantageous for the 
seller, who can access private information about the object to publish all available 
information than to keep information secret, to publish only selected positive 
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information, to publish an aggregated version, or to bias the information before 
publishing (Milgrom and Weber 1982).  
 
3.3 Information and Learning in Multiple Object Auctions 
 
What has been said about information and learning in single object auctions in the 
previous section basically applies for multiple object auction procedures, too. However, 
the collection and the correct analysis and interpretation of information can be much 
more complicated than in the single object case. Furthermore, the danger that the 
process of generating useful information is disturbed is much higher in multiple object 
auctions. The reasons for these problems usually lie in characteristic weaknesses of the 
chosen auction designs and in the bidders’ restricted capability or insufficient 
preparation for participating in a complex auction procedure. Game theoretical analyses 
as well as the courses and the results of some telecommunication auctions, for example, 
support this hypothesis (Ausubel and Cramton, 1998; Ehrhart, 2001; Klemperer, 2002; 
Seifert and Ehrhart, 2003).    
 
4. New Technologies and Appropriate Auction Designs 
 
Recently the application field for auctions has changed. The reasons for this are 
enhanced possibilities caused by the use of information technology. More complex 
auctioning procedures have become feasible which may help sellers to gain valuable 
information about bidders’ preferences. Extensive multiple object auctions and Internet-
based auctions with participants in different locations are examples of this.   
 
4.1 C2C-Auctions 
 
Electronic auctions are popular in the Internet and are used for several purposes. 
Auctions in the consumer-to-consumer (C2C) sector are well known. They are 
conducted by companies such as eBay, Yahoo, Ricardo, and Amazon. Internet-based 
auctions have also recently been used for business-to-business (B2B) transactions, 
particularly in the automotive sector. Most of those electronic auctions are part of 
 11
eProcurement and eSourcing, and they are thus inverse auctions with suppliers acting as 
bidders. Electronic Procurement and electronic Sourcing are a supplement to and an 
enhancement of traditional markets.  
Let us first concentrate on C2C-business. Here, eBay, for example, offers the 
platform and the tools for running auctions. The participants are private sellers and 
buyers, which is meant by the expression consumer-to-consumer. The auction platform 
organises the communication between market participants. Participation occurs 
independent of the location (however, most auctions are for participants in the same 
country only). This is the first important difference from traditional auctions which are 
organised at a fixed time and a predetermined place where all bidders have to come 
together. The timeframe is still fixed (for individual differences see next paragraph), but 
C2C-auctions, in general, run for several days, and the time for submitting a bid is 
arbitrary within this period. The bidders do not have to meet at a certain place, and thus 
many more potential buyers can be addressed.  
Furthermore, bidders do not have to keep an eye on the auction for the whole 
auctioning period. In many C2C-Internet auctions, self-acting bidding agents (proxies) 
act on behalf of the bidders and increase their bids. The bidders just have to submit their 
maximum bids. This common auction type is usually carried out as a second-price 
auction and therefore induces bidders to reveal their true willingness to pay their 
maximum bid. 
Amazon auctions have a scheduled end time; however, the auction continues if 
there are still active bidders. An auction does not end until ten minutes have passed 
without a bid being submitted. Auctions on eBay operate under similar rules as Amazon 
auctions but have a fixed deadline at which the auctions definitely end. Roth and 
Ockenfels (2002) consider the implications of these different ending rules. Although a 
bidder does not have a dominant strategy in this type of auction, the eBay ending rule 
implies incentives for ‘sniping’. Sniping denotes the bidding behaviour of submitting a 
bid as late as possible. Sniping is a reasonable behaviour in this kind of auction. 
However, there are also arguments against sniping. If all bids in an auction with this 
ending rule were submitted at the last possible moment, it would essentially be 
converted into a sealed bid auction with some uncertainty about whether bids go 
through. 
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4.2 B2B-Auctions 
 
Auctions in B2B-markets also have the advantage of being independent of location and 
local distribution. Thus, it becomes possible for locally distributed bidders to participate 
in a live auction (in contrast to a sealed bid auction with a fixed finish time). The 
auction’s organiser also has the advantage of being able to contact bidders all over the 
world and allow them to bid simultaneously. In the business-to-business sector it is thus 
possible to take advantage of competition between suppliers, instead of protracted 
bilateral bargaining in several rounds, to determine prices. The other bidders do in 
general not know a bidder’s identity. Suppliers, on the other hand, can reach new 
customers without huge effort by participating in Internet auctions.  
Electronic auctions are ascribed to have several advantages for both suppliers 
and buyers (Ott, 2002). For the supplier it is easier to find buyers, and for the customer 
it is easier to find sellers. For different industrial sectors, special Internet marketplaces 
exist where the two parties can meet. The procurer hopes to find greater market 
transparency and thus the best offer in the market. As he is able to contact a larger 
number of suppliers, he expects lower prices due to stronger competition. Getting in 
contact with a large number of suppliers without the help of information technology 
would be too expensive and time consuming. B2B-autions also have some advantages 
for the supplier with respect to information compared to bilateral bargaining. A well-
designed auction should have clear rules and a well-defined information processing and 
supply structure. Participants can track the course of the auction and have access to 
information about their bargaining position at any time.1 Acceleration of proceedings 
and lower transaction costs are further advantages of procurement via Internet auctions.  
 
                                                 
1 In many actual auctions, however, the bidders are provided with very little information. This may have 
an impact on the strategy and on the seriousness of bidding. The design and implementation of B2B-
auctions should allow participants to rely on a truthful mechanism (Ott, 2002). 
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4.3 Central Bank Operations 
 
The main refinancing operations stand at the centre of the Eurosystem monetary policy. 
These are offered by the European Central Bank (ECB) on a weekly basis with a two-
week maturity. This procedure represents the primary way that the Eurosystem makes 
refinancing available to the financial sector. As a rule, main refinancing operations take 
the form of so-called repo auctions.  
Since several thousand banks participate as bidders in these auctions, it is 
impossible for all these banks to send representatives to the central bank once a week. 
Therefore, it is common practise to submit bids via Internet just in time. Former 
alternatives such as submitting bids via telephone or sending sealed bids by mail are 
associated with excessive effort and expenses compared to the Internet procedure.  
The main refinancing operations are also supposed to aid in gaining information 
about the money market, which is important for evaluating and planning monetary 
policy. For this, it is necessary that the participating banks indicate their true demand 
for refinancing in their bids. Consequently, the procedure should be designed in such a 
manner that the banks are induced to reveal their true demand. Until May 2000 the fixed 
price (rate) tender procedure was employed almost exclusively. However, this method 
does not meet this requirement. During the time in which this type of auction was 
applied, a continual rise in the bids could be observed, and there was not any doubt that 
the banks immoderately exaggerated their true demand with their bids (Ehrhart, 2001).  
As a consequence, in June 2000 the ECB decided to switch to the method of the 
discriminatory price (rate) auction. In this auction banks may submit up to ten rate-
quantity bids. Since a very large number of banks participate in the repo auctions, the 
discriminatory price auction procedure induces banks to approximately reveal their true 
willingness to pay for liquidity.2 Thus, the goal of the Central Bank to gain valuable 
information about the money market is obtainable but only by intensely employing 
information technology.  
 
                                                 
2 In a discriminatory price auction, optimal bidding requires bid shading, meaning that bidders 
underrepresent their true valuation (Ausubel and Cramton, 1998). 
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4.4 Other Applications 
 
During the last decade, auctions have become more important for awarding public 
licenses and concessions. One reason is that they are supposed to be a more efficient 
allocation mechanism than so-called ‘beauty contests’ (Binmore and Klemperer, 2002).  
For this purpose, telecommunication licenses, for example, have been auctioned 
all over the world. Licenses for telecommunication services are based on the right to 
send and receive radio signals on a certain frequency over a specified geographic area. 
For this purpose, in different countries several auction formats were used which differed 
with respect to the degree of complexity. As before, the auctions need to have been well 
designed in order to induce bidders to reveal in their bids their true willingness to pay. 
The auction format designed for the German UMTS auction in the year 2000, for 
example, met this requirement to a certain degree; however, it was characterised by a 
high degree of intricacy (Seifert and Ehrhart, 2003). In this auction, the number of 
licenses was not fixed in advance. Both the frequency endowments of a licensed 
operator as well as the number of licenses resulted endogenously from the auction. The 
frequency spectrum was divided into 12 blocks which were simultaneously auctioned in 
a multiple round, ascending auction. In order to become licensed, a bidder had to obtain 
at least two blocks. Consequently, it was possible that either four, five, or six bidders 
became licensed. It is intuitively clear that complex auctions, like the German UMTS 
auction, can only be conducted by means of strong electronic support. 
Recently, auctions have also been considered for use in environmental policy, 
i.e. for allocating emissions allowances. Auctioning emissions allowances in advance 
will generate valuable price signals at an early stage and therefore help participating 
companies to cope with the tasks of the new instrument, provided that the auctions are 
designed in an appropriate way (Ehrhart et al., 2003). This project, however, requires a 
complex, multiple object auction setting in which several thousand companies 
participate at the same time. This task is only manageable with the support of powerful 
computer networks.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
The auction market institution has proven to be a powerful instrument for managing 
specific economic transactions, particularly in situations that are characterised by a high 
degree of asymmetric information or not yet existing markets. Even in this situation, 
auctions may create efficient outcomes. New technologies empower the old market 
institution of auctions that have already been applied for a long time. Applications in 
C2C-trade, awarding of contracts in the B2B-sector, allocation of telecommunication 
licenses, and applications in central bank refinancing operations give an impressive 
illustration of the power of modern complex auctioning schemes.  
Furthermore, auctions can be used to gain information. The auction method 
enables the auctioneer to outsource the process of searching and generating information. 
In this context, we have presented several cases in which applying auction procedures is 
advantageous compared to other transaction methods. However, the use of auctions 
demands that the participants be educated about them. Uneducated bidders, for example, 
run the risk of not only harming their competitors but also themselves even more 
severely. If the seller intends to learn through the auctions, it is in his best interest to 
have skilled bidders. Finally, we have to point out that the auction method is not a 
panacea.   
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